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.S. monetary policy has a purely domestic mandate. The Federal
Reserve’s task is to promote “maximum employment, price stabil-
ity and moderate, long-term interest rates” within the United
States.1 Or, as Arthur Burns put it in 1973, “American monetary policy is
not made in Paris; it is made in Washington.”2 That said, this article will
argue that global developments have played a significant role in setting
the focus and practice of U.S. monetary policy in the years since Frank
Morris became President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. When
Frank Morris joined the Fed in 1968, the Bretton Woods system—based as
it was on the dollar’s unsustainable link to gold—was on the verge of col-
lapse. Even so, the U.S. dollar remained the only viable international
transactions currency at that time, and the financial “world” encom-
passed a mere handful of nations edging the North Atlantic, plus, grudg-
ingly, Japan. Today, of course, the major currencies are floating, the euro is
increasingly used as a transactions currency, and investor horizons have
widened to include emerging markets on every continent. 
Within this changed setting, the U.S. economy has itself become con-
siderably more open to international trade and investment flows. Thus,
promoting U.S. price stability and maximum sustainable growth has
increasingly required taking global developments into account. Usually,
these developments have been taken as “givens,” inputs to the data set on
which policy decisions are based. From time to time, however, interna-
tional developments—such as major exchange rate shifts—have elicited a
Fed policy response aimed at influencing the course of these “external”
events. The intent, of course, has always been an improved long-term out-
come for the U.S. economy. 
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Beyond changing the setting in which U.S. policy
decisions are made and the considerations on which
they are based, international forces have also influ-
enced the evolution of the U.S. financial system and,
thus, the practice of U.S. monetary policy. Over the
past forty years, foreign opportunities and foreign
competition have helped drive financial innovation
and regulatory change in this country. These develop-
ments, among others, eventually forced the Fed to de-
emphasize monetary aggregates and to adopt the fed-
eral funds rate as its operating target instead.3 These 
Global developments have played 
a significant role in setting the focus
and practice of U.S. monetary policy
in the past forty years. 
same forces also contributed to the demise of the
Glass-Steagall (interindustry) and McFadden (inter-
state) restrictions on bank activities.4 Shifts in central
bank practice overseas may also have encouraged sim-
ilar changes in this country.
This article examines the impact of global devel-
opments on the practice of U.S. monetary policy,
broadly defined to include regulatory and lender-of-
last-resort functions as well as open market, discount,
and intervention activity, over the past forty years. The
first section briefly reviews a few familiar facts estab-
lishing the increased openness of the U.S. economy.
The second section explores episodes when external
events beyond those included in the domestic out-
look—events like significant exchange rate shifts—
appear to have influenced policy decisions. The
authors would like to emphasize that the analysis
relies in large part on an admittedly subjective exami-
nation of the Records of Policy Actions of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) and of the Board of
Governors found in the Board’s annual reports. The
section explores what sorts of events triggered a policy
response. Have the frequency or causes of these
episodes changed with the advent of floating rates and
increased capital market integration? Do the patterns
suggest any lessons? Section three peers into the
future, applying the lessons of the past, and section
four provides a summary and conclusions.
I. The Increased Openness of the U.S. Economy
Although the world is arguably no more open
today than it was at the start of the twentieth century,
the U.S. economy is certainly more open than it was at
the beginning of the 1960s. As real exports plus
imports have grown from less than 10 percent of GDP
in the early 1960s to almost 30 percent currently
(Figure 1),5 net exports have come to exert a notable
impact on GDP growth on a more frequent basis. In
the early years (1960 to 1974), net exports added or
subtracted 1 percentage point or more from GDP
growth rather infrequently, as Figure 2 shows. But
from 1975 to 1984 and again in the late 1990s, net
1 Federal Reserve Act. The phrase “maximum employment” is
generally interpreted to mean maximum sustainable growth and
employment. 
2 Cited by Wells (1994, p. 109) from Volcker and Gyohten (1992,
pp. 103--104). 
3 The shift from targeting monetary aggregates to relying on an
exchange rate anchor or, more recently, an inflation target (with or
without an intermediate interest rate target) is a global phenomenon.
4 These developments will not be covered in this version of the
conference paper. See Cooper and Little (2001).
5 On a nominal basis, exports plus imports have increased
from less than 10 percent to almost 25 percent of GDP. The difference
reflects the fact that prices have increased less (or fallen more, in the
case of computers and other high-tech equipment) for tradable than
for non-tradable products.
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exports affected GDP growth by 1 percentage point or
more over 40 percent of the time. The periods of obvi-
ous impact coincided with the oil shocks, the huge dol-
lar appreciation and LDC debt crisis of the 1980s, and
the more recent Mexican and Asian financial crises
and their economic consequences. The pattern is also
highly countercyclical, naturally enough, with net
exports having a positive impact on U.S. growth just
before and during a U.S. recession and a negative
impact during a U.S. recovery. Confirming the old saw 
U.S. international trade in securities
has grown even faster and now looms
considerably larger, relative to GDP,
than trade in goods and services.
about the contagious effects of U.S. colds leading to
pneumonia overseas, this pattern suggests that the
United States has frequently been the instigator of
world downturns as well as the engine of world
growth. But in recent years, the impact of the Asian cri-
sis on the giant U.S. economy through the trade chan-
nel is clearly visible. 
Less familiar is the fact that U.S. international
trade in securities has grown even faster and now
looms considerably larger, relative to GDP, than trade
in goods and services (Figure 3). While nominal
exports plus imports equaled 23 percent of GDP in
1999, gross U.S. international transactions in securities
equaled 200 percent of GDP. These data suggest that
private capital flows rather than trade flows have been
driving the large exchange rate swings of recent years.
Reflecting the promise of this country’s “new econo-
my,” and concerns about needed reforms in Europe
and Japan as well as in many emerging markets, these
capital inflows surged notably in the late 1990s and
now make up a significant share of the funds raised in
the U.S. credit markets. Since 1995, foreigners have
provided, on average, 35 percent of the total credit
raised by the U.S. nonfinancial sector (Figure 4), up
from an average 2 percent in the early 1960s. In addi-
tion, in the past three years foreigners have acquired
about 10 percent of the increase in U.S. corporate equi-
ties outstanding. The stimulus provided by these capi-
tal inflows plus the wealth effect of the related increase
in U.S. asset prices appears—rather unexpectedly—to
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have more than offset the
negative impact of deteriorat-
ing net exports on the U.S.
economy.6
As the U.S. economy has
become more open, access to
data on foreign economies
has improved, and various
new markets have emerged,
the preparatory materials for
FOMC meetings have come
to cover a growing number of
countries in greater detail.
Still, the minutes frequently
label international trends “a
key area of uncertainty,” and
the cumulative spillover
effects of synchronous down-
turns and recoveries remain
hard to foresee. Over the forty
years covered by this paper
(1960 to 2000), FOMC interest
has naturally turned from the
deficits and gold outflows
that drew its attention during the late 1960s to the like-
ly impact of net exports on U.S. demand conditions
and of the dollar’s exchange rate shifts on price devel-
opments in this country. In recent years, for instance, 
The impact of international capital
flows on U.S. asset prices and 
on investment and consumption
activity in this country has received
limited attention. 
some Committee members have attributed the sur-
prisingly good behavior of U.S. inflation in part to the
increased competition and the reduced capacity con-
straints facing U.S. producers, thanks to the strong
dollar, slack conditions in our trading partners, and
increased outsourcing from overseas. By comparison, 
the impact of international capital flows on U.S. asset
prices and on investment and consumption activity in
this country has received limited attention.
II. Beyond the Domestic Outlook: How Have
International Events Influenced Fed Policy?
As described above, in pursuing their domestic
goals of price stability and maximum sustainable
growth, the members of the FOMC always consider
the likely impact of net exports and the foreign
exchange value of the dollar on U.S. demand condi-
tions and inflation. But beyond that considerable influ-
ence, to what extent have Fed policymakers based pol-
icy decisions on “international” considerations—to
affect the foreign exchange value of the dollar, for
instance, or in reaction to external financial crises? The
conventional answer is almost never. This section reex-
amines the issue and comes to a somewhat different
conclusion. 
To look for evidence of international influence, we
examined the Records of Policy Actions for the Board
of Governors and for the FOMC for the past forty
years.7 This exercise required considerable interpreta-
tion, of course, and other readers might come to some-
6 In addition, White (1999) suggests that the stimulative terms-
of-trade effects of an appreciation may work to offset the substitu-
tion effects, which tend to shift domestic demand to foreign prod-
ucts. He posits that combined terms-of-trade and substitution effects
may partly explain the unexpectedly low inflation and strong con-
sumer spending experienced in the United States in recent years.  
7 Eventually, in the case of the FOMC, the Record of Policy
Actions became the Minutes. 
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what different conclusions in specific cases. However,
the records usually provide a rationale for the deci-
sions made and give some guidance on the weights
assigned to the various, often conflicting, arguments
put forth in determining the ultimate outcome.8 For
example, in February 1978, a majority of the FOMC
members agreed that the weak dollar “militated 
International developments appear 
to have influenced monetary policy
more frequently than is generally 
recognized—even in the period 
of floating exchange rates. 
against” easing while domestic sluggishness preclud-
ed tightening. Thus, the compromise outcome, clearly
influenced in part by international considerations, was
a decision to maintain existing monetary conditions.
On occasion, moreover, and usually after some debate,
the members of the FOMC have changed the wording
of the highly formulaic directives to the New York Fed
in order to highlight particular concerns. For example,
in May 1973, the directive
instructed that FOMC policy
be implemented “taking
account of international and
domestic financial market
developments,” reversing the
usual order. A year later, the
usual order (“domestic” first)
was restored. 
The results of this effort
are displayed in Figure 5,
which shows the number of
times each year that interna-
tional considerations other
than those incorporated in the
domestic outlook seemingly
affected discount rate deci-
sions or the domestic policy
directive for open market
operations.9 The red bars indi-
cate when international events
were the primary reason for
action (or lack thereof), while
the grey bars show when
international considerations helped tip the balance. The
figure does not have a bar representing changes in
Regulations D and M,10 which the Fed made frequently
in the late 1960s through the mid 1970s in an attempt to
limit capital outflows or encourage capital inflows; such
efforts had fallen out of favor by the late 1970s. Apossi-
ble final instrument, U.S. intervention in the foreign
exchange markets, is discussed separately below.
Clearly, as Figure 5 indicates, the episodes when
the Board or the FOMC made policy decisions primari-
ly for international reasons are rare.11 However, possi-
8 The text indicates, for instance, that “most members noted
…” while “some” or “a few” mentioned a different point.
9 The FOMC met sixteen times a year, on average, from 1960 to
1969 and then roughly monthly until 1981 when it began meeting
eight times a year. To adjust for these differences in the frequency of
meetings, in Figure 5, the number of FOMC decisions partly influ-
enced by international considerations was divided by 2 between
1960 and 1971 and by 1.5 between 1972 and 1982. Because the Board
of Governors changes the discount rate whenever it deems appro-
priate, the number of discount rate decisions influenced by interna-
tional factors was not adjusted. Neither were the rare occasions
when international factors were the primary reason for FOMC poli-
cy decisions.
10 Regulation D governs depository institution (originally
member bank) reserve requirements. Regulation M governs the for-
eign branches of member banks. 
11 The episodes we identified as times when international fac-
tors had a primary influence largely correspond with dates men-
tioned by Eichengreen (2000), Volcker and Gyohten (1992), and
Wells (1994) as the rare instances when international pressures
caused a change in Fed policy.
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bly because Fed policymakers must often make deci-
sions in the face of considerable uncertainty and on the
basis of conflicting indicators, international develop-
ments appear to have influenced policy at least margin-
ally a good deal more frequently than is generally rec-
ognized—even in the period of floating exchange rates. 
The U.S. economy is now highly
open to influence from abroad. Only
a few industries are now seriously
protected, and financial markets are
wide open to international investors.
As the bar graph suggests, international issues
were generally more influential in periods of dollar
weakness (for example, 1978--79 and 1985--87) or at
times when currency or debt crises in emerging mar-
kets threatened the liquidity (or solvency) of U.S. finan-
cial institutions (for example, the mid 1980s and 1998).
By contrast, it was relatively easy for central bankers
with a mandate for maintaining price stability to ignore
dollar appreciations that supported their fight against
inflation. (Figure 6 shows the real U.S. trade-weighted
foreign exchange value of the dollar in terms of the
major currencies from 1973 on.) The most recent
decade appears to be an anomaly, however. Other than
the pronounced impact of the Asian crisis, internation-
al concerns were fairly muted in the early to mid 1990s,
even during 1994 and 1995 when the dollar was
approaching its post-Bretton Woods lows. Does the
recent experience suggest that the United States has
learned to live comfortably with a floating dollar? The
following subsections will review in more detail the
periods when exchange rate shifts and international
financial crises have had a perceptible impact on policy.
Exchange Rate Pressures
According to Figure 5, concerns about dollar out-
flows and the viability of the Bretton Woods arrange-
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ments were barely perceptible in 1960 but had become
a “malignant preoccupation” (Eichengreen 2000) by
1967--68. These anxieties then diminished as the
United States headed into the 1970 recession that
prompted a temporary and misleading improvement
in the U.S. current account.12 It should also be noted,
however, that Fed policymakers used a variety of tools
not covered in Figure 5 as they tried to shore up the
crisis-prone fixed exchange rate system.13 The Fed’s
search for extra tools reflected its penchant throughout
the 1960s and 1970s for pursuing several, often incom-
patible, objectives simultaneously. In addition to limit-
ing the buildup of dollar assets in foreign official
hands, these goals included easing Treasury financing
operations, limiting financial disintermediation,14 pro-
moting the growth of bank credit, especially mortgage
loans, discouraging inflation, and, clearly the top pri-
ority, encouraging a more complete utilization of the
nation’s resources.
Among the supplementary tools used for interna-
tional ends were capital controls, Operation Twist,
and intervention in the foreign exchange markets.
Begun in 1961, Operation Twist entailed concentrating
open market purchases in long-term securities “when
feasible.”15 In theory, international capital flows were
more responsive to short-term than to long-term
interest rates, and this effort was intended to keep
short-term rates higher than they would otherwise
have been. In addition, starting in 1965 the Fed was
responsible for ensuring that banks complied with the
government’s restraints on foreign investment. When
this voluntary credit restraint program promoted the
development of the Eurodollar market, the Fed began
to use its Regulations D (reserve requirements) and M
(foreign bank operations) as capital controls, as dis-
cussed further below. 
In the end, however, these multifaceted but limit-
ed efforts to save fixed exchange rates failed. As the
United States pulled out of the 1970 recession, its cur-
rent account resumed deteriorating, and, flooded with
huge, unwelcome private capital flows from the
United States, the German and Dutch authorities
allowed their currencies to float.16 The Swiss and the
Austrians revalued. By August 1971, U.S. liabilities to
foreign officials stood at $41.5 billion, almost double
their value at the end of 1970, while U.S. reserve assets
(mainly gold) had fallen to $12.1 billion. With no
acceptable alternative, President Nixon ended the dol-
lar’s remaining links to gold. In the end, neither the
United States nor the Europeans were willing to sacri-
fice their domestic economic goals for a chronically
endangered system that both the deficit and the sur-
plus countries had come to view as flawed.
International pressures reappeared in the Fed’s
deliberations when the currency revaluations negotiat-
ed at the Smithsonian Institution in December 1971
proved inadequate to correct ongoing U.S. payments
12 The official settlements balance and the liquidity balance, two
other measures that attracted much attention in the 1960s, also
improved in 1968 and 1969 and in 1970, respectively. See Eichengreen
(2000) and Fieleke (1971) for a discussion of these measures.
13 The decade was studded by a series of currency crises
involving the dollar to be sure, but also the British pound, the
French franc, and the Canadian dollar, as well as recurring specula-
tion concerning possible appreciation of the deutsche mark.
14 At that time Regulation Q (governing interest rates on
deposits) frequently set ceilings on interest rates payable by member
and FDIC-insured nonmember banks below rates available in the
money market and at thrift institutions. The goal was to anchor
interest rates, particularly for mortgage loans, and to prevent exces-
sive competition for funds from leading to high-risk lending. As a
result, during periods of rising interest rates, the banks generally
had difficulty attracting or holding funds. 
15 For instance, in May 1967, the FOMC decided that “purchas-
es of coupon issues, if and when feasible,” could lighten the supplies
of government securities in the maturities in which supplies were
heaviest. They also noted that the substitution of purchases of
coupon issues for purchases of bills “could be important for balance
of payments reasons, as a means of reducing downward pressures
on bill rates.” Prior to 1961, System open market transactions were
conducted only in short-term securities. With the change in policy,
30 percent of the securities purchased outright in 1961 had a maturi-
ty of more than one year. 
16 The Europeans took action in May 1971; the Japanese floated
in August. The Canadian dollar had been floating since June 1970. 
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deficits, and massive capital flows from the United
States resumed. This renewed inflationary onslaught
led the Europeans to initiate a joint float against the
dollar in early 1973—a fateful step that ended the early
Bretton Woods era and started the Europeans on the
path to monetary union.17
Thereafter, the first oil shock triggered an inflow
of petrodollars, a modest dollar appreciation, and a 
deep U.S. recession. These developments reduced the
impact of currency concerns on Fed decision-making.18
However, when the foreign exchange value of the dol-
lar plunged to consecutive new lows in the late 1970s,
the press of international issues reached new highs.
Indeed, the 1-percentage-point rise in the discount rate
that was announced on November 1, 1978, as part of a
joint Treasury–Federal Reserve package to strengthen
the dollar was the largest increase in forty-five years.
The package included higher reserve requirements,
the threat of forceful, coordinated foreign exchange
intervention, plus an increase in the fed funds rate to
accommodate the new discount rate. Under Bretton
Woods, episodes of dollar weakness had merely
threatened foreign complaints and, eventually, the col-
lapse of an unworkable system. Under the new float-
ing regime, a falling dollar meant “continuing domes-
tic inflationary pressures,” which called for strong
countermeasures.
By sharp contrast, despite a severe, double-dip
recession, the strong dollar of the early 1980s elicited 
little concern. Beryl Sprinkel, who did not believe in
foreign exchange market intervention, was Under
Secretary of the Treasury, and dollar appreciation was
helping the Volcker Fed to meet its overriding goal of
subduing inflation.19 Despite complaints from the
nation’s manufacturers, the Reagan Administration
hailed the strong dollar as a vote of confidence in the
vibrant U.S. economy. By late 1984, however, FOMC
members began to see the dollar’s unprecedented
strength as a serious problem affecting manufacturers
and farmers and their creditors and distorting invest-
ment decisions. Thus, limiting the dollar’s rise became
a policy goal. With this policy shift, the announcement
of the Plaza Accord, and modest U.S. dollar sales,20 the
dollar quickly reversed its five-year appreciation in a
matter of months—at which point limiting its plunge
became a major concern, as emphasized by the G–10
announcement from the Louvre in February 1987.
Under the new floating regime, 
a falling dollar meant “continuing
domestic inflationary pressures,”
which called for strong 
countermeasures. By contrast,
despite a severe, double-dip recession,
the strong dollar of the early 1980s
elicited little concern. 
Renewed dollar strength in 1989 led to substantial dol-
lar sales in the foreign exchange market. These dollar
sales provoked expressions of concern among FOMC
members, but, once again, the dollar’s appreciation
did not. 
A further episode of notable dollar weakness
occurred in 1994–95 when the dollar again approached
its post-Bretton Woods lows on a trade-weighted basis
and historic lows against the German mark and the
Japanese yen. While this episode also led to modest
intervention in the foreign exchange markets, Fed pol-
icymakers evinced limited concern about the dollar’s
behavior, in contrast to the more pronounced anxiety
shown during previous periods of dollar depreciation.
What had changed? According to the FOMC minutes,
what had changed was the Fed’s attitude toward for-
eign exchange intervention.
17 Mileposts on the path to the European Monetary Union
(EMU) included the three-stage Werner Plan for monetary unifica-
tion (1970); the establishment of the joint float or “snake in the tun-
nel,” an arrangement in which most EC members kept their curren-
cies within a 4.5 percent band which undulated within a 9 percent
band around the dollar (1973); the establishment of the European
Monetary System (1979); the signing and ratification of the Treaty of
Maastricht, which laid out the criteria for membership in the
European Monetary Union (1992 and 1993); and the start of EMU
and the euro, the single European currency, on January 1, 1999.
18 While the oil shocks clearly emanated from abroad, their
impact became part of the domestic outlook. Moreover, the tensions
involved reflected the domestic need to choose between offsetting
either the demand or the price effects of an oil price shock, not a con-
flict between domestic and international priorities.
19 Rather, the renewed influence of international issues from
1982 to 1984 shown in Figure 5 reflected the impact of the LDC debt
crisis on the large money center banks, as discussed further below.
20 These dollar sales involved the purchase of German marks
and Japanese yen. By this time, James Baker had replaced Donald
Regan as Secretary of the Treasury.
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Intervention Policy
The legal authority and responsibility for U.S.
intervention policy have never been clearly delineat-
ed. Nor have FOMC members always been comfort-
able with their role in this area. Both the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve appear to have congressional
authorization to intervene. The Federal Reserve Act
allows Reserve banks to deal in specified assets,
including “cable transfers,” a phrase that referred to
foreign exchange in 1913. In addition, section 10 of the
Gold Reserve Act of 1934 gives the Secretary of the
Treasury, with the approval of the President, the
power to buy and sell foreign currencies “for the pur-
pose of stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar.”
The Act also created a $2 billion Exchange Stabilization
Fund (ESF) to permit the Secretary of the Treasury to
carry out the provisions of the section.21
By tradition, possibly because congressional
intention seems a bit clearer in the case of the Treasury,
that department has usually taken the lead in foreign
exchange intervention policy. But the New York Fed 
Models of exchange rate 
determination have never been able
to explain or predict actual 
exchange rate behavior.
actually conducts all intervention operations. While
the Treasury can order the New York Fed to intervene
on behalf of the Treasury, it cannot require the Fed to
intervene for its own account. However, the two agen-
cies almost always intervene jointly, since working at
cross-purposes in foreign exchange matters would
clearly be counterproductive. In addition, in the past
and with the knowledge of the Congress, the Treasury
Department has periodically increased the ability of
the ESF to intervene by requesting that the Fed engage
in swap transactions. Under these arrangements,
which must be authorized by the FOMC, the Fed buys
the Treasury’s foreign currency spot for dollars, with
offsetting forward contracts reversing the transaction.
The purpose is to expand the ESF’s ability to engage in
purchases of foreign currency. 
The top panel of Figure 7 displays U.S. interven-
tion activity monthly since 1973, while the bottom
panel shows U.S. official purchases and sales of dollars
for foreign currencies relative to open market purchas-
es and sales of domestic securities. As the second panel
suggests, U.S. foreign exchange intervention has
always occurred on a very modest scale compared with
domestic open market operations. Rarely amounting to
as much as 3 percent of domestic transactions, these
data are certainly consistent with the Fed’s statements
that U.S. foreign exchange interventions are “routinely
sterilized” by offsetting operations in domestic securi-
ties. Not only is U.S. intervention activity small-scale in
comparison to domestic open market operations; it is
also small-scale relative to foreign governments’ inter-
vention against the dollar. For instance, from October
1977 to the end of 1978, the U.S. authorities bought $10
billion to support the dollar while foreign authorities
bought about $37 billion. Again, in the five weeks after
the Plaza Accord, the G–5 sold $9 billion, of which the
United States sold $3.3 billion.22 And, of course, all offi-
cial intervention activity is dwarfed by the total vol-
ume of transactions in the foreign currency markets,
which now exceeds $1.5 trillion each day.23
No wonder, then, that most studies of the efficacy
of foreign exchange intervention conclude that this
activity has no—or at most fleeting—impact on for-
eign exchange rates. (See Edison 1993; Humpage
1996.) Indeed, if foreign exchange interventions are
routinely sterilized, they could only affect the
exchange rate by serving as a signal that macro policy
is about to change or that, by official judgment, market
expectations are no longer linked to economic funda-
mentals (Dominguez and Frankel 1993 a, b). On the
other hand, as Schwartz (2000) has pointed out in her
review of the literature on foreign exchange interven-
tion, models of exchange rate determination have
never been able to explain or predict actual exchange
rate behavior. Thus, it is not possible to compare the
impact of intervention with the outcome prevailing in
its absence. Moreover, these studies generally examine
the impact of intervention holding macro policy con-
stant. But, as a comparison of Figures 5 and 7 suggests,
21 The $2 billion represented the bulk of the windfall accruing
to the government when the nation revalued gold from $20.67 to $35
per ounce. 
22 See Pauls (1990) and Solomon (1999, p. 15).
23According to the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) tri-
ennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market
Activity last conducted in 1998. The number includes spot transac-
tions, outright forwards, and forex swaps. 
Little pgs 33-56  10/17/01  5:16 PM  Page 4142 Issue Number 3 – 2001 New England Economic Review
Little pgs 33-56  10/17/01  5:16 PM  Page 42Issue Number 3 – 2001 New England Economic Review 43
from 1973 to 1989 periods of heavy intervention
appear to correspond with periods when international 
developments were exerting at least some marginal
influence on Fed policy.24 After 1989 the correspon-
dence vanishes. But if exchange rate pressures do in
fact influence policy outcomes from time to time, then
the results of these intervention studies may be biased.
From 1973 to 1989, periods of heavy
intervention appear to correspond
with periods when international
developments were exerting at 
least some marginal influence 
on Fed policy. After 1989 the 
correspondence vanishes. 
Why did the link between foreign exchange inter-
vention and the influence of international issues on
Fed policy appear to weaken in 1989? Or alternatively,
why did Fed policymakers express only limited con-
cern as the dollar sank to new lows in 1994--95, and the
United States made the sizable interventions shown in
Figure 7? The policy records suggest that this discrep-
ancy between words and actions may reflect the fact
that, starting in 1989, a significant minority of FOMC
members began to oppose U.S. intervention activity.
This opposition was not entirely new. When the
FOMC first authorized System operations in foreign
currencies in 1962, two governors dissented.25 They
argued that such a program required analysis by out-
side experts, public discussion, and legislative clarifi-
cation. They also doubted the legality of Fed interven-
tion (although the General Counsels of the FOMC and
the Treasury and the Attorney General of the United
States had all agreed that the System was authorized
to conduct such operations). Nevertheless, the majori-
ty endorsed the new program. And in the years there-
after, the FOMC repeatedly raised the ceiling on
System holdings of foreign currencies for its own
account and for the account of the ESF. And it repeat-
edly expanded its reciprocal currency (or swap)
arrangements—both in terms of membership and of
the dollar value of the commitments.26 All of these
cooperative arrangements provided resources for for-
eign exchange intervention.
Starting in 1989, however, while the United States
was participating in coordinated intervention to limit
the dollar’s appreciation, a minority group of Fed gov-
ernors27 began to dissent from endorsing ever-greater
holdings of foreign currencies. In March 1990, in par-
ticular, three FOMC members dissented from raising
the ceiling for System holdings of foreign currency
“warehoused” for the Treasury. They argued that
recent interventions to weaken the dollar undermined
the credibility of the Fed’s commitment to price stabil-
ity, were probably ineffective, and, in the case of the
warehousing facility, were inappropriate without an
indication of congressional intent. While the majority
authorized the increase, many members expressed
doubt that intervention could have lasting effect and
suggested that future intervention should be limited.
Because of these concerns, the System broke with the
Treasury and did not participate in intervention sales
of dollars made between March 5 and the end of
1990.28 The following year the Fed resumed interven-
ing with the Treasury on a “moderate” scale, and any
interventions since then have been joint.
As Figure 5 suggests, finally, the most recent peri-
od of significant dollar weakness engendered further
doubt about intervention29 and an unusually detached
response to the dollar’s fall. In mid 1994, with the dol-
lar in a steep decline, two members of the FOMC took
the unusual step of refusing to ratify System interven-
tion activity that had already taken place. They argued
that repeated failures to achieve intervention objec-
tives would raise questions about the credibility of Fed
24 If so, whether or not intervention is always fully sterilized
becomes a moot point.
25 The Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund had begun con-
ducting foreign exchange operations, with the New York Fed acting
as agent, in March 1961. These operations were part of a cooperative
effort involving treasuries and central banks on both sides of the
Atlantic to counter disorderly conditions in the foreign exchange
markets (Board of Governors 1962, p. 54). The dissenting governors
were Governors Mitchell and Robertson.
26 Membership in the swap network eventually included the
central banks of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland, and the Bank for International
Settlements. At their peak in early 1995, these credit lines equaled
$35.4 billion. As discussed below, most of these agreements have
been allowed to lapse. 
27 In 1989 and 1990 this group included Governors Angell,
Johnson, and LaWare, and President Hoskins from Cleveland.
28 Board of Governors (1990, p. 33).
29 Expressed particularly by Governor Lindsey and Presidents
Broaddus (Richmond) and Jordan (Cleveland).
Little pgs 33-56  10/17/01  5:16 PM  Page 4344 Issue Number 3 – 2001 New England Economic Review
policy more broadly.30 Moreover, while FOMC deliber-
ations sometimes referred to the inflationary impact of
dollar depreciation, the rationale for the significant
shift to tighter monetary policy that actually occurred
at this time rarely cited the dollar. For example, in
March 1995, the members noted that policy should not
be directed to achieving a given level for the dollar but
to implementing effective anti-inflation policy, taking
account of all relevant factors. 
Meanwhile, the fed funds rate doubled to 6 per-
cent in fifteen months, while the discount rate went
from 3 percent to 5.25 percent. In both cases, the last
50-basis-point rise took place in early 1995 as the dol-
lar neared its low point. The domestic conditions that
provoked these changes included an acceleration in
real GDP growth to a peak of 4.4 percent, year-over-
year, in the third quarter of 1994 (after which time
GDP growth slowed) plus a decline in the unemploy-
ment rate from 6.6 percent to 5.5 percent.31 Core infla-
tion (consumer prices excluding food and energy) held
steady near 3 percent. Given the policy changes that
actually occurred, and the domestic context in which
they occurred, it is hard to know whether the FOMC
was quite as indifferent to the dollar’s 1994--95 decline
as Figure 5 suggests. Since then, of course, the dollar’s
strength has been an asset in the Fed’s efforts to keep
inflation low.
To supplement evidence of FOMC concerns about
the exchange rate found in the Records of Policy
Actions, the authors also looked at the impact of U.S.
official intervention activity on FOMC decisions to
change the fed funds rate, using logit estimations of
the FOMC voting patterns and a model of the FOMC’s
reaction function developed by Stephen McNees (1986
and 1992) and Geoffrey Tootell (1997). In addition to
the other explanatory variables used by Tootell,32 we
added U.S. official net purchases or sales of dollars
(deflated by the GDP deflator) made in the weeks pre-
ceding the FOMC meeting. This variable represents a
possible measure of official concern about the dollar
exchange rate. In the reaction function equations, the
coefficient on dollar purchases is positive, suggesting
that intervention to support the dollar tends to be
associated with an increase in the fed funds rate, and it
is significant at the 10-percent level. Dollar sales, asso-
ciated with a strong dollar, have no statistically signifi-
cant impact. Otherwise, the introduction of the inter-
vention variables has little impact on Tootell’s original
results. 
In the logit estimations of FOMC voting decisions,
dollar purchases are positively related to the probabil-
ity of tightening, negatively related to the probability
of loosening; both coefficients are highly significant. In
other words, according to these results, the larger the
official dollar purchases, the more likely the FOMC is
to tighten and the less likely it is to loosen. In the case
of dollar sales, which enter the equation as negative
values, the coefficient is positive as expected and high-
ly significant. That is, the larger the dollar sales, the
less likely is an FOMC decision to tighten. Dollar sales
do not have a statistically significant impact on the
probability of a decision to loosen. The regression
results and a figure showing a plot of the residuals
from the baseline equation and real net intervention
activity may be found in the Appendix.
This review suggests that in periods
of steep depreciation, the dollar has
continued to exert at least marginal,
although perhaps dwindling, 
influence on U.S. monetary policy—
even in the current floating-rate era. 
All told, this review suggests that in periods of
steep depreciation, the dollar has continued to exert at
least marginal, although perhaps dwindling, influence
on U.S. monetary policy—even in the current floating-
rate era. The size of the U.S. current account deficit,
now 4 percent of GDP and rising, could lead to a new
test of this tentative conclusion at any time.
International Financial Crises
While less pervasive than exchange rate issues,
international financial crises have also influenced Fed
policy decisions from time to time. Moreover, the
increased severity and scope of these crises have posed
new challenges for the Fed in its roles as supervisor
and occasional international lender of last resort. 
30 Board of Governors (1994, p. 161).
31 These numbers exceeded the prevailing estimates of poten-
tial growth and the NAIRU. 
32 Tootell’s explanatory variables were Board staff forecasts of
real GDP growth and core inflation in the six-month period immedi-
ately ahead and in the following six-month period, the forecast civil-
ian unemployment rate one quarter ahead, and the lagged three-
month moving average of M1 growth.
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During the 1960s, the notable financial crises
involved the major industrialized countries, a club-
like group whose governments usually responded to
currency pressures in a fairly cooperative fashion—
The increased severity and scope of
international financial crises have
posed new challenges for the Fed in
its roles as supervisor and occasional
international lender of last resort. 
although the degree of cooperation clearly dwindled
as the crises recurred. These years saw the develop-
ment of the London gold pool, for instance, and of the
reciprocal currency arrangements (or swap network)
that allowed member central banks to draw foreign
currencies as needed to bolster their foreign exchange
reserves.33 The FOMC generally expanded and author-
ized the use of these facilities without much debate,
upon request by foreign governments and the U.S.
Treasury. And more than once
the FOMC actually cited cur-
rency weakness in another
country as a reason for delay-
ing a move to tighter policy.34
While the citizens of Britain
or France must surely have
felt the impact of the devalua-
tions and more restrictive
macro policies triggered by
crises involving the pound
and the franc, central banks
and treasuries generally 
contained these currency
upheavals without anything
resembling a serious econom-
ic downturn, and the U.S.
banking system remained
largely unaffected.35
That was not true in the
aftermath of the LDC debt
crisis of the 1980s, however.
The oil shocks of 1974 and
1979--80 had led to consider-
able concern about the
financing needs of the oil-importing developing coun-
tries. Thus, as OPEC members deposited the bulk of
their surging oil revenues in U.S. banks or in the
Eurodollar market, U.S. lenders took the lead in recy-
cling the petrodollars to the developing countries.
U.S. bank claims on all foreigners rose from less than 5
percent of total U.S. commercial bank assets in early
1974, at the end of the voluntary credit restraint pro-
gram, to 20 percent of total assets at their peak in early
1983. As Figure 8 shows, this growth was particularly
rapid between 1980 and 1982. While Fed Chairman
Arthur Burns, Fed Governor Henry Wallich, and oth-
ers periodically warned the banks against allowing
excessive concentrations of LDC debt to build up, the
banks faced significant market incentives36 and offi-
cial encouragement to make these loans. According to
William Seidman, economic counselor to President
Ford, “the entire Ford Administration, including me,
33 See Solomon (1982) and Perry and Tobin (2000), particularly
the pieces by Bator, Cooper, and Eichengreen. 
34 For example, in the fall of 1967 members of the FOMC cited
the pressures on the pound as one of several reasons not to tighten
U.S. monetary conditions. 
35 Except for the impediments of the capital controls.
36 For example, the development of the commercial paper mar-
ket in the 1970s and 1980s was luring the banks’ best corporate 
borrowers.
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told the large banks that the
process of recycling petrodol-
lars to the less developed
countries was beneficial, and
perhaps a patriotic duty.”37
Moreover, contemporary stud-
ies generally concluded that
this largely sovereign debt
was relatively safe (Beek in
Curry 1997; Terrell 1973).
Those studies notwith-
standing, Mexico suspended
debt service on an $80 bil-
lion foreign debt in August
1982; by late 1983, twenty-
seven nations owing $239
billion had rescheduled.
Soon after, references to
financial strains and the
need for monetary condi-
tions to accommodate them
began to crop up in the
FOMC minutes. For exam-
ple, in October 1982 the
FOMC voted to reduce pres-
sures in the private capital
markets, pressures that
reflected the “well-publi-
cized problems of a few U.S.
and foreign banks and the
acute financial difficulties in
Mexico and other develop-
ing countries.”38 These prob-
lems had caused a flight to
quality, increased interest
rate spreads, and a height-
ened demand for liquidity.39
References to strained finan-
cial conditions and the
impact that higher interest
rates would have on LDC
debtors and their U.S. creditors continued through
1983--84. 
To be sure, the U.S. oil, agricultural, and real
estate sectors also suffered serious financial prob-
lems in these years, but the LDC debt crisis clearly
added significantly to the “financial fragility” of the
decade. As Figure 9 shows, the nonperforming share
of “all other” loans (the category that includes the
LDC debt) and the charge-off rate on these loans
grew rapidly in the early 1980s—even relative to the
worsening experience with other types of assets.
Moreover, while total real estate assets greatly
exceeded loans to LDC borrowers, the impact of the
real estate crisis was comparatively diffuse. By con-
trast, LDC assets were highly concentrated at the
nation’s eight largest money-center banks, where,
37 Cited in Curry (1997, p. 206). 
38 These specific problems occurred in the context of unusually
high interest rates. Interest rates on 3-month CDs in the secondary
market averaged 16 percent in 1981 and 12 percent in 1982. 
39 Similarly, in May 1983 five members dissented from a shift to
slightly more restraint, in part because of the “tenuous” situation in
some developing countries.
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according to the FDIC data, LDC debt amounted to
250 percent of their capital base. Thus, as was widely
recognized at the time, several of these banks were
technically insolvent. (See also Cline (1995) for a
review of these developments.)
In the event, U.S. authorities did not immediately
require the banks to set aside large reserves on their
restructured and nonperforming LDC loans. The
delay, coupled with public funding for the LDC
debtors, allowed the banks to raise additional capital
before they began, starting with Citicorp in 1987, to
recognize the bulk of their losses on their LDC debt.
By late 1989 the money center banks had posted
reserves for almost 50 percent of their outstanding
LDC loans. Finally, in 1989, the Brady Plan shifted the
focus from debt rescheduling to debt relief. With the
help of funds from the IMF and World Bank, the
debtor nations used various instruments like debt--
equity swaps to reduce their debt to manageable pro-
portions. Private sector debt forgiveness amounted to
about one-third of the face value of the $191 billion in
outstanding loans, potential losses that could accrue
to the lending banks’ shareholders.40
In the wake of the first LDC debt crisis, U.S.
banks remained relatively cautious about lending
to the  emerging markets; thus, most U.S. banks were
not severely affected by the Mexican peso crisis of
1994--95 or by the early stages of the Asian crisis.
Indeed, it was not until the “Asian” crisis had spilled
over from Southeast Asia to North Asia to Russia and
was starting to threaten Latin America and, finally,
Long-Term Capital Management and other highly
leveraged institutions and their creditors that U.S.
financial markets began to seize up. Referring to the
turmoil in U.S. and global money markets, in the fall
of 1998 the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate by 75
basis points in three steps; the Board cut the discount
rate twice. According to the Board’s 1999 annual
report, these moves were deemed desirable “to cush-
ion the U.S. economy from the effects of disruptions in
world financial markets and to ameliorate some of the
resulting strains….”
International Standards, Disclosure, and 
Market-Based Discipline
The shock of the first LDC debt crisis gave fresh
impetus to G-10 efforts to negotiate internationally
accepted standards for capital adequacy and other 
The shock of the first LDC debt crisis
gave fresh impetus to G–10 efforts 
to negotiate internationally 
accepted standards for capital 
adequacy and other supervisory 
and regulatory issues. 
supervisory and regulatory issues. The United States
frequently drove these efforts because, obviously, the
quality of foreign financial supervision was by then
closely linked to the safety and soundness of U.S.
banks, and, given the jurisdictional issues involved,
improving this quality required a multilateral, mar-
ket-driven approach. Although the first such multi-
lateral agreement, the Basle Concordat,41 had been
concluded in 1975, progress since then had been
slow. Indeed, as William White has pointed out, all
too often an international financial crisis was
required to move the negotiations forward; thus, real
progress on the international capital adequacy stan-
dards only began after the Mexican crisis of 1982
(White 1996).
But the motivations behind these initiatives
included competitive as well as prudential concerns.
While it was essential that the U.S. banks repair the
damage that recent crises had inflicted on their cap-
ital positions, U.S. regulators did not want to place
U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
foreign banks enjoying less stringent capital require-
ments. At the time, foreign banks, particularly the
Japanese,42 were rapidly gaining market share—
40 Cline (1995, pp. 234-35). Debt forgiveness was calculated as
the sum of the reduction in the face value of the original debt and
the reduction in the present value of interest reductions, less the
amount spent on buybacks. Not all of this debt forgiveness actually
resulted in losses to the banks, however, because the value of much
of this Brady debt appreciated on the secondary market that soon
developed.
41 The Basle Concordat established the principle that no foreign
bank should escape adequate supervision.
42 In 1981, one of the world’s top ten largest banks, in terms of
assets, was Japanese. In 1987, the seven largest banks were Japanese
(Wagster 1996).
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thanks in large part, it was
thought, to their less costly
capital requirements.43 As
Figure 10 shows, the foreign
banks’ share of total bank
assets in the United States
about tripled between the
early 1970s and the late
1980s.44 Thus, when the U.S.
regulators moved on their
own to require U.S. banks to
hold more capital after the
Mexican crisis, they met a
storm of criticism from the
industry, which, in turn,
encouraged renewed efforts
to reach an international
agreement. When interna-
tional progress stalled, Fed
and Bank of England offi-
cials forged ahead with a
bilateral agreement, incor-
porating the U.K. practice 
of using risk-weighted capi-
tal standards. Because other
nations feared that their banks might lose access 
to the important U.S. and U.K. financial mar-
kets, this deal led to renewed negotiations and, 
in 1988, eventual agreement on the Basle Capital
Accord.
The Capital Accord sets a capital requirement 
of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets for internation-
ally active banks. Banks must meet half of the
requirement with Tier 1 capital—primarily common
stock and retained earnings. The balance may be met
with Tier 2 capital, which includes loan loss reserves,
subordinated debt, and revaluation reserves for
fixed assets and equities—a category of particular
interest to the Japanese. Reflecting a compromise
between the U.S., U.K., and Japanese authorities, 
45 percent of unrealized capital gains on equities
may be counted as Tier 2 capital. (The Japanese had
long held out for 70 percent.) Market discipline and
international peer pressure among supervisors have
encouraged widespread compliance with the
Accord. Thus, by September 1993, all G–10 banks
with significant international operations were meet-
ing its requirements. 
Experience has led to a series of revisions to the
Accord. Because the original risk categories were
coarse and arbitrary, treating all sovereign or all corpo-
rate debt the same, they encouraged lenders to favor
the riskiest borrowers in each category.45 Accordingly,
the 1999 revisions reflect an increased concern with
market and operational as well as credit risk. And, in a
search for better measures of credit risk, they propose
weighting bank assets by the credit ratings assigned
by commercial rating agencies, like Moody’s. With
U.S. encouragement, the revised Accord also recog-
nizes that banks’ internal rating systems could in
43 In 1987, unrealized capital gains seemingly comprised the
bulk of Japanese banks’ capital. Equity plus reserves with no debt
provisions (similar to core or Tier 1 capital) amounted to about 2
percent of Japanese bank assets. The ratios for U.S. and U.K. banks
were 4.9 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively (Wagster 1996).
44 In the case of consumer and industrial loans, where foreign
competition was particularly intense, the foreign share was
approaching 20 percent. Counting loans booked offshore, Japanese
banks were thought to have captured about 12 percent of the U.S.
banking market (Wagster 1996).
45 Indeed, critics like Jeffrey Sachs have pointed out that the
Basle capital standards may have contributed to the Asian crisis
because the risk weights encouraged short-term interbank lending.
Interbank claims with a residual maturity of one year or less carried
a risk-weight of 20 percent, regardless of where the borrowing bank
was incorporated. Longer-term claims on banks incorporated in an
OECD member have a 20 percent weight. Longer-term claims on
other banks are weighted at 100 percent. 
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future provide the basis for setting capital require-
ments in some cases.46
Writing in 1996, William R. White attributed much
of whatever success the international community had
achieved in creating globally accepted standards to
U.S. and, to a lesser extent, U.K. leadership. He sug-
gested, however, that the growing importance of the
emerging countries and the increased ability of the
Europeans to speak with one voice might undermine
U.S. leadership and complicate the process of making
further gains by international agreement. In the event,
the crises of 1997--98 served to reinforce the validity of
the BIS approach with its emphasis on capital require-
ments, supervisory review, and disclosure and mar-
ket-based discipline. As those crises also demonstrat-
ed, however, market discipline can be fickle as well 
as harsh.
The Fed as International Lender of Last Resort
Times when market discipline becomes too harsh
and markets cease to operate may call for intervention
by a lender of last resort (LLR). But international finan-
cial crises may have outgrown the Fed’s ability to
serve that function in the international arena. As these
crises have turned global and become increasingly 
As financial crises have turned 
global and become increasingly 
complex, the Fed has traded its 
occasional role as international
lender of last resort for the role 
of leading international facilitator. 
complex, thanks in part to the participation of growing
numbers of private agents, the Fed has traded its occa-
sional role as ILLR for the role of leading international
facilitator. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, as already discussed,
the Fed and the central banks of the other major indus-
trial countries provided reciprocal ILLR facilities to
members of the North Atlantic community plus Japan
through the swap arrangements. Time and again, the
FOMC authorized expansions of and drawings on
these facilities—seemingly without much debate.
Mexico was the only developing country to participate
in these swap arrangements, which it used from time
to time. For example, in 1976, after the peso devalued
by 37 percent against the dollar, the FOMC’s Foreign
Currency Subcommittee approved a $600 million
Treasury–Federal Reserve loan to the Bank of Mexico
“to counter disorderly exchange-market conditions . . .
pending the receipt of medium-term financing from
the International Monetary Fund.” Similarly, in
August 1982 the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
announced that they were participating in a multilat-
eral package to provide the Bank of Mexico with a
total of $1.85 billion in short-term financing. The funds
were to be made available in line with progress toward
agreement between Mexico and the IMF on an adjust-
ment program that would allow Mexico to qualify for
drawings under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility.47
As these examples suggest, the swap program pro-
vided short-term LLR finance to its members in part
because the IMF could not—and indeed was not
designed to—serve in that capacity. The need for such
finance was seemingly taken for granted. The creation of
the General Arrangements to Borrow in 1962 also sug-
gests that G–10 governments felt a need to supplement
the resources available through the IMF. Like the swaps,
this $6 billion facility was only available to the G–10. 48
In contrast, by the time of the 1994 Mexican peso
crisis, the atmosphere had changed. While a majority
of FOMC members voted to make a $6 billion swap
arrangement available to the Bank of Mexico and to
increase from $5 billion to $20 billion the amount of
foreign currency that the System was prepared to
warehouse for the Exchange Stabilization Fund, two
FOMC members dissented. The dissenters argued that
developments in Mexico did not clearly threaten U.S.
financial stability and that it was inappropriate for the
Fed to participate in medium-term financing to facili-
tate debt restructuring.49 They were also concerned
46 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has sought to
apply capital standards to market, interest rate, and operational risk
as well as to credit risk. For this purpose, and again under pressure
from the United States, where risk measurement and management
are relatively well advanced, the Committee has agreed to accept a
bank’s internal model for assessing “market value-at-risk.” In a relat-
ed initiative, the Fisher Committee, a subcommittee of the BIS Euro-
currency Standing Committee, has also urged greater disclosure, as
opposed to regulation, of various types of risk—particularly for those
risks associated with off-balance-sheet items such as derivatives.
47 Mexico prepaid all of its U.S. swap drawings.
48 Plus Mexico, in the case of the swaps.
49Actually, all of the Fed’s swap transactions with Mexico were
short-term. By contrast, the bulk of the Treasury’s swaps were medi-
um-term.
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about participating in what appeared to them to be a
fiscal action without congressional authorization or
more general public approval. The passage of the
Mexican Debt Disclosure Act in April 1995 requiring
the Treasury and the President to provide detailed
reports on all guarantees to, and currency swaps with,
the government of Mexico by the U.S. government,
including the Federal Reserve, suggests the Congress’s
displeasure.
Accordingly, the U.S. response to the Asian crisis
was very circumspect. This country did not participate
in the multilateral package that was made available to
Thailand, and it provided only backup, or second-line,
support for the other Asian countries in crisis. U.S.
funds were made available only on an if-needed basis.
By contrast, the Fed did play an important role in facil-
itating the negotiations that led the major U.S. banks to
roll over their Korean credits during that country’s
dollar liquidity crisis at the turn of 1997--98.50 The New
York Fed assumed a similar role at the time of the
LTCM debacle nine months later.
The end of the swap network 
reflects current exchange rate
arrangements, the pending 
introduction of the euro and the 
creation of the ECB, and extensive
criticism that lender-of-last-resort
facilities create moral hazard. 
In November 1998 the FOMC voted to allow the
reciprocal currency arrangements with the Bank of
Japan, the Bank for International Settlements, and the
European governments to lapse. The only remaining
swap arrangements are those with the Bank of Canada
and the Bank of Mexico under the North American
Framework Agreement (NAFA) set up in 1994.
For the members of the G–10 plus Mexico, the
swap network represented a response to a felt need
that the IMF could not fill. Its end reflects current
exchange rate arrangements, the pending introduc-
tion of the euro and the creation of the European
Central Bank, and extensive criticism from parts of
academia and the press that domestic and internation-
al LLR facilities create moral hazard. It also reflects
the fact that world politics are not yet as global as
world financial crises. That said, engaging the private
sector more fully in resolving financial crises is a high-
ly desirable goal.
III. Reflections on the Future
The trends in the world economy identified in this
article are likely to continue and indeed may even
accelerate. In particular, the U.S. economy is now high-
ly open to influence from abroad. Within the goods
market, only the defense industries and a few agricul-
tural products, such as sugar, are now seriously pro-
tected from international competition; and many serv-
ices are increasingly subject to direct competition from
abroad. Of course, some activities, such as construc-
tion, retail trade, schoolteaching, or medical care, will
remain domestic, although even they are subject to
influence and takeover through foreign direct invest-
ment. Similarly, financial markets are now wide open
to international investors; with the securitization of
mortgages even that very local form of loan is now
internationally marketable.
A new element in the picture is the creation, in
January 1999, of the euro, which in financial markets
has replaced the German mark, French franc, Italian
lira, and eight other European currencies, permit-
ting the development of a Europe-wide capital mar-
ket without currency risk. Japan has also shed 
its last restrictions on inflows and outflows of capi-
tal, although the poor performance of the Japanese
economy and traditional conservatism of Japanese
savers have postponed full exploitation of the new
potentialities.
In general, floating exchange rates have served
the United States well over the past two decades. An
appreciating dollar dampened U.S. growth during the
fiscal stimulus of 1981 to 1984, and again during the
robust growth of 1995 to 2000; a depreciating dollar
stimulated U.S. growth during the years 1991 to 1995,
a period of recession and fiscal drag due to tax increas-
es in 1990 and 1993. (The same cannot be said for Japan
where, as McKinnon and Ohno (1997) have persua-
sively argued, exchange rate movements have con-
tributed to destabilizing expectations and poor eco-
nomic performance.) 
50 The congressional constraints on ESF lending that followed
the Mexican peso crisis limited Treasury–Fed participation in the
Thai loan package but had expired when the Indonesian and Korean
packages were put together.  
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A key question is whether past is prologue to the
future. It is churlish to raise doubts about the future in
a period in which the U.S. economy has performed so
well, and to which such good performance Federal
Reserve policy has been an important contributor, at
least in the negative sense of not having aborted it pre-
maturely. Nonetheless, a case can be made that
exchange rate flexibility will not be so benign for the
United States during the next two decades as it was
during the last two. Indeed, many U.S. firms would
welcome a weaker dollar now, both to improve their
export competitiveness and to give them more room
for domestic price increases in the face of rising wage
rates and materials costs. Much action on the price-
raising front would no doubt trigger a reaction from
the FOMC, with the effect of strengthening the dollar
but also weakening construction and other interest-
sensitive expenditures—as well as raising U.S. interest
payments on the over $3 trillion in interest-sensitive
securities and other claims held by foreigners. 
But suppose the U.S. economy slowed substan-
tially without a significant depreciation of the dollar.
Then it is likely that American businesses would begin
to complain vociferously about foreign competition
and would turn to the Congress for protectionist relief,
as they did between 1983 and 1985. Or suppose that
higher interest rates in Europe, combined with a slow-
down in the United States, led to significant shifts in
worldwide portfolios, away from dollars toward euro-
denominated securities, so that the dollar depreciated
not by a tolerable 10 percent but by a startling 25 per-
cent or more. In addition to black headlines from
financial journalists around the world, many asset
holders would be thrown into confusion and would
wonder when the rout would stop, since the potential
for portfolio shifts would be huge and subject to short-
run herd dynamics. Extensive dollar depreciation, in
turn, given the openness of the American economy,
would permit a corresponding rise in prices of trad-
able goods and services and would put the FOMC in
the dilemma of whether to raise U.S. interest rates in
conditions of serious economic weakening.
The general point is that the United States is
increasingly exposed to external events and to
changes in portfolio preferences around the world.
Asset holders (including Americans) face a much
wider menu of choices than has historically been the
case, as foreign securities markets improve. It is not
too early to begin to reflect on how U.S. monetary pol-
icy might need to be recast to allow for these changes,
with a view to mitigating their impact on the
American economy.
Here are two thoughts: First, the Fed should think
actively about, and begin to experiment with, under-
taking open market operations in selected foreign
securities, especially euro-denominated securities.
Second, the Fed should examine switching the main
focus of its attention for measuring price stability from
the consumer price index (CPI) to the (finished goods)
producer price index (PPI), encouraging the European
Central Bank, the Bank of Japan,51 and the Bank of
England to do the same.
The United States is increasingly
exposed to external events and 
to changes in portfolio preferences
around the world.
Since the PPI is composed predominantly of
tradable goods, if all four major economies were to
focus on the PPI, their targets would be similar, ulti-
mately perhaps identical. (As with the CPI,
allowance might be made for exceptional move-
ments in particular prices, for example, oil products,
giving rise to a “core PPI.”) Over the past two
decades, the U.S. PPI rose 1.5 percentage points less
than the CPI, while over the past five years the dif-
ference has been about 1 percentage point. Thus, a
PPI target could be numerically lower than the corre-
sponding CPI target, and conceiving of “zero infla-
tion” on this measure would be less problematic
than it would be with the CPI.
Focusing on the PPI would provide the nominal
anchor that many observers feel is necessary for mone-
tary policy. In particular, it would satisfy the
Maastricht Treaty’s injunction to the European Central
Bank to target “price stability.” It would also achieve a
degree of (long-term) coordination of monetary policy
among the three major industrial regions, since the
focus of monetary policy in each would be similar, if
not identical.
With monetary policies focused on the PPI, the
51 The Bank of Japan has recently begun announcing an infla-
tion forecast as a means for guiding inflation expectations.
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consumer price index could, if appropriate, rise by dif-
fering amounts in the major industrial economies, thus
giving somewhat greater flexibility to differential
movements in real wages, which would help to
accommodate any low-frequency asymmetric shocks
among the three regions. This would take some pres-
sure off the need for exchange rate changes to deal
with such shocks over time. 
Foreigners hold nearly $6 trillion in marketable
securities and other liquid assets in the United
States, and, of course, Americans hold much more. A
substantial portfolio shift (or, given the large U.S.
current account deficit, even a substantial diminu-
tion of net capital inflows) would result in a depreci-
ation of the dollar relative to the destination curren-
cies, possibly a substantial depreciation. Given the
extensive openness of the U.S. economy, that in turn
would result in increases in the dollar prices of most
goods and some services. (Ironically, U.S. anti-
dumping laws strongly encourage foreigners in peri-
ods of dollar depreciation to raise their dollar prices
after no more than 60 days.52) That in turn could
induce the FOMC to tighten monetary conditions,
perhaps stemming the outflow of interest-sensitive
funds, but depressing the U.S. stock market. Thus,
the impact on net capital flows is ambiguous and,
especially in the short run, could stimulate further
outflows. The question is how much damage to the
real economy is tolerable, even if one is confident
that some level of asset prices and exchange rates
will lead portfolio allocations to be revised and per-
haps reversed.
It would be desirable for the Fed to have options
other than simply tightening monetary conditions,
that is, by intervening in foreign exchange markets
with a view to influencing market expectations about
exchange rates, which have been shown to be extreme-
ly fragile in recent years. One strategy would be to
wait until a run occurs and rely on cooperation from
foreign monetary authorities to provide adequate sup-
port in the emergency. Some cooperation is likely to be
forthcoming, since other countries will not want to see
their currencies appreciate rapidly and far, for reasons
of international competitiveness.
An alternative, more foresighted strategy would
be for the United States to build foreign exchange
reserves or lines of credit during a period of relative 
financial calm. The swap lines with Europe and Japan
that were allowed to expire in late 1998 could be
renewed. And the Federal Reserve could begin, ini-
tially on a modest scale, to engage in open market
purchases of foreign securities.53 This would put some
downward pressure on the dollar exchange rate,
which would be welcome to many U.S. firms and
would not put undue pressure on an economy whose
growth seems to be slowing down. And it would
A foresighted strategy would be 
for the United States to build 
foreign exchange reserves or lines 
of credit during a period of relative
financial calm. 
build up U.S. holdings of foreign assets at a time
when they are relatively inexpensive. Higher reserves
would be welcome if significantly disturbing private
switches out of dollar-denominated assets were to
occur in the future. It would also represent a partial
response to the diminishing supply of Treasury secu-
rities projected to be available for open-market pur-
chase in the coming years.54
Of course, the Federal Reserve should not pur-
chase foreign securities without cooperation with
other central banks, to avoid intervention at cross-pur-
poses. As is well known, in a world of n currencies
there are only n—1 independent exchange rates; inde-
pendent action by n central banks is not possible. The
“nth country problem” has been generally solved by
U.S. abstention from the foreign exchange market.
Until September 2000 it seemed the European Central
Bank would also adopt a position of abstention, leav-
ing room for some U.S. activity. With European inter-
vention, cooperation in a U.S. buildup of euro-denom-
inated reserves becomes necessary. 
53 In June 1999 the Bank of England began to accept euro-
denominated bonds issued by European governments and interna-
tional agencies as collateral for repurchase agreements. The Bank
started to conduct open market operations via repos in early 1997.
54 This strategy might also deliver some advantages in terms of
increased risk-sharing across nations, which analysts suggest could
increase welfare by noticeable amounts. See Athanasoulis and van
Wincoop (2000).
52 Failure to do so subjects them to dumping charges and leads
to the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Once imposed, such
duties are difficult to remove.
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
It is often suggested that U.S. monetary policy is
largely or even entirely inward oriented, taking into
account only the needs of the U.S. economy, with little
or no reference to the rest of the world. We have tried
to show that this view is largely incorrect, in at least
three different respects.
The first, generally accepted respect is that
greater engagement with the rest of the world in
both trade and financial transactions leads the U.S.
economy to be more directly affected by overseas
developments than it was three or four decades ago.
Exports have occasionally accounted for as much as
40 percent of annual U.S. economic growth; U.S.
prices are influenced by world price developments,
most obviously in the case of oil. Movements in
exchange rates can also affect prices of imported
goods, hence prices of domestic substitutes for
imported goods. More intense foreign competition
has reduced the sensitivity of domestic prices to the
pressures of aggregate demand, and it has undoubt-
edly contributed to shifting downward the level of
unemployment that is consistent with price stability.
These changes in the structure of the U.S. economy
in response to greater openness have of course affect-
ed the way the Federal Reserve responds to U.S. eco-
nomic developments.
Second, a perusal of FOMC records reveals exten-
sive references to international developments in dis-
cussions of the future direction of monetary policy.
These international factors were not always or even
often decisive in determining U.S. monetary policy;
but they were frequently factored into the overall
evaluation of the economic environment. And occa-
sionally—during some periods of pronounced dollar
weakness, for instance, or during the emergence of
the debt crisis in August 1982 and the international
financial crisis of late 1998—the FOMC’s desire to
affect the course of these developments played a
major role.
Third, external competitive pressures have facili-
tated substantial changes in the structure of the U.S.
financial system.55 Indeed, arguably, they were an
important factor in breaking down the geographical
and business barriers that had shaped the U.S. bank-
ing system since the 1930s.56 This interplay between
financial innovation and changes in the regulatory
structure of the U.S. banking system has in turn affect-
ed how monetary policy works. As Frank Morris was
one of the first to note, these innovations made the
monetary aggregates increasingly poor guides for pol-
icy decisions. The ensuing search for a substitute has
led to the current policy focus, both in the United
States and abroad, on short-term interest rates and the
central bank’s ultimate goals—price stability and sus-
tainable growth. 
These diverse channels of international influence
on U.S. monetary policy will no doubt continue and
even intensify in the future. In the 1960s, “internation-
al” work could generally be left to one designated
member of the Federal Reserve Board, with occasion-
al attention from the Chairman. These days most
members of the Board are drawn into international
matters at least occasionally, as are many of the
Reserve Bank presidents, and foreign developments
demand much attention from the Chairman. Just as
many domestically oriented agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment, like the SEC or the FBI, are finding that they
cannot meet their responsibilities without intensive
work with their foreign counterparts, so too the
Federal Reserve is likely to grow increasingly interna-
tionalized as it strives to stabilize the U.S. economy.
Financial supervision and the provision of interna-
tional lender-of-last-resort facilities are two areas
where the need for cooperation is particularly keen.
While the development of international standards
represents considerable progress on the supervisory
front, a resolution of the issues surrounding the
lender of last resort remains more elusive. 
Finally, as our review of FOMC decision-making
suggests, on occasion, big exchange rate swings
widely viewed as unrelated to macroeconomic fun-
damentals still plague even the largest economies.
Thus, the world’s major central banks are likely to
want to devote ongoing—or even increased—atten-
tion to stabilizing their exchange rates. The fact that
most major central banks are now focused on attain-
ing similar low rates of inflation should help in this
regard. Nevertheless, because exchange rate shifts
sometimes reflect forces other than changes in the rel-
ative price of traded products, we believe that the
Fed will need, among other things, to stand ready to
engage more extensively in open market operations
in foreign securities. Thus, it will also need to build
its stock of such assets.
55 As noted at the beginning of this article, this subject is dealt
with in detail in the conference paper from which this article has
been taken (Cooper and Little 2001).
56 The Board of Governors (as opposed to the FOMC) spends
much time on regulatory issues, which have been dominated, except
in periods of financial crisis, by the changing competitive structure
of financial services.
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Appendix Table 1
FOMC Voting and Reaction Functions
Logit Estimations of FOMC Voting Reaction Functions
(1) Original (2) Original (3) Original (4) Original (5) Original (6) Original
Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation
with Dollar with Dollar with Dollar with Dollar
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Dependent Variable: Vote for Tightening Dependent Variable:
Change in Federal Funds Rate
C –.02 –.26 –.05 –.10 .08 –.04
(–.04) (–.69) (–.13) (–.62) (–.41) (–.20)
QH1 .07 .07 .09 .01 .01 .009
(2.24) (2.48) (3.08) (.87) (.87) (.73)
QH2 .11 .13 .05 .05 .06 .05
(2.68) (3.02) (1.18) (2.49) (2.70) (2.59)
PH1 .12 .18 .16 .002 .02 .006
(1.57) (2.39) (2.16) (.06) (.38) (.14)
PH2 .11 –.0008 .11 .04 .02 .03
(1.31) (–.009) (1.34) (.94) (.37) (.73)
URF –.46 –.41 –.46 –.5 –.06 –.06
(–8.40) (–7.54) (–8.43) (–2.31) (–2.14) (–2.38)
M .04 .04 .05 .009 .009 .01





Dependent Variable: Vote for Loosening
C 1.56 1.76 1.52
(3.82) (4.27) (3.71)
QH1 –.31 –.33 –.31
(–10.81) (–11.22) (–10.88)
QH2 –.04 –.04 –.05
(–0.93) (–.84) (–1.12)
PH1 .13 .07 .16
(1.55) (.80) (1.85)
PH2 –.41 –.35 –.45
(–4.35) (–3.57) (–4.63)
URF –.08 .09 –.07
(–1.50) (–1.66) (–1.33)






Observations 2406 2406 2406 237 211 211
Log-Likelihood –2002.7 –1977.8 –1979.4 –116.8 –108.1 –109.9
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Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Definitions of Variables
QH1 Forecast of real GDP growth over the next 6 months
QH2 Forecast of real GDP growth over the 6 months starting 6 months from now
PH1 Forecast of inflation over the next 6 months
PH2 Forecast of inflation over the 6 months starting 6 months from now
URF 1-quarter-ahead civilian unemployment forecast
M Lagged 3-month moving average of M1 growth
RBUY U.S. official purchases of dollars (deflated by GDP deflator) in intermeeting period just past 
(millions of dollars)
RSELL U.S. official sales of dollars, that is, negative purchases (deflated by GDP deflator in intermeeting period
just past (millions of dollars).
The Green Book was used for all the forecasts.
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